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RESUMÉ 
Denne artikel forholder sig til en diskussion om, hvordan man skal forstå 
forholdet imellem Husserls kartesianske vej og den senere ontologiske vej til 
den transcendentale reduktion: Er den kartesianske vej fejlagtig, og udgør den 
ontologiske vej således en principiel korrektion, eller er den ontologiske vej en 
logisk fuldstændiggørelse af en utilstrækkelig, dog nødvendig, kartesiansk 
vej? Der foreslås i denne artikel en læsning, der har til hensigt at 
sandsynliggøre, at der i denne diskussion også er plads til et tredje alternativ. 
Her ses begge veje som tilstrækkelige, og den ontologiske vej ses således som 
en uddybning af særligt underbetonede men ikke principielt fraværende 




This paper assesses a discussion on how to understand the relationship 
between Husserl’s Cartesian way and the later ontological way to the 
transcendental reduction: Is the Cartesian way flawed to the extent that the 
ontological way constitutes a principal correction to it, or is the ontological 
way a logical completion of an insufficient but nonetheless necessary 
Cartesian way? A reading with the purpose of rendering probable that this 
discussion allows for a third alternative is proposed in this paper. Such a 
reading claims that both ways are individually sufficient. The ontological way 
is thus taken to be a clarification of certain underemphasised though not 
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Introduction 
In a very short paper, Dan Zahavi (2005) claims that the future of 
phenomenology depends upon researchers’ abilities to strengthen the 
Husserlian heritage instead of committing to aggressive and negative 
criticisms by arguing that Husserlian phenomenology is a collection of non-
unified and heterogeneous projects. Zahavi proposes that philosophers 
should take some of these criticised projects in Husserlian philosophy 
seriously because they are still relevant. “This is in particular so, given that 
there are core features of the Husserlian methodology that remain 
indispensable to contemporary phenomenology, the most prominent one 
being the transcendental reduction” (Zahavi 2005). Given that Zahavi is 
correct in arguing that the transcendental reduction is indeed indispensable 
for any contemporary and future phenomenology, it is important to have a 
clear understanding of how one should grasp the relationship between the 
different accounts of the reduction offered by Husserl. 
The transcendental reduction can as of now be identified as a response to the 
need for a rigorous and presuppositionless philosophical viewpoint within 
Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy. This viewpoint constitutes an 
absolute starting point for philosophy. In this sense, ‘transcendental 
reduction’ indicates the movement away from the natural and everyday-like 
attitude towards the world and its constituents and into a philosophical-
phenomenological worldview. I will elaborate this in more detail in the next 
section of this paper. 
At least three different paths to the transcendental phenomenological 
reduction in Husserl’s writings are commonly recognised today: The Cartesian 
way, the way through intentional psychology, and the ontological way. These 
distinctions have led to a discussion on how to understand the relationship 
between especially the first and the last of the ways. Iso Kern (1977) has 
argued that only the ontological way constitutes a complete way to the 
desired end of the transcendental reduction. However, in response, John 
Drummond (1975) has suggested that the Cartesian and the ontological ways 
presuppose each other in order for the reduction to be complete. In the third 
and fourth sections of this paper, I will present these two ways to reduction. 
In the fifth section, I will attempt to present an interpretation of the passages 
of Ideas from 1913 in which Husserl develops the Cartesian way and 
subsequently the passages of The Crisis from 1936 in which he develops the 
ontological way. This interpretation differs from the aforementioned 
positions. I wish to point to a logical space for an alternative third position in 
the Kern/Drummond debate as well as to outline what this position amounts 
to. The third position takes each way to be sufficient in itself. Firstly, it does 
not agree with Kern’s (1977) idea that the Cartesian way fails to grasp the 
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sense of the transcendental reduction and that the ontological way thereby 
constitutes a principal correction to it, with the result that the ontological way 
is the only valid of the two. Secondly, it does not agree with Drummond’s 
(1975) conclusion that one must recognise a logical dependence between the 
two ways. Nonetheless, the third position accepts Drummond’s idea that, in 
order for something to be an absolute starting point for philosophy, it must be 
both absolutely apodictic and have absolute ontological precedence. It thus 
becomes clear that I must provide an account of the ways to the reduction and 
that this account, unlike Drummond’s view, renders probable that both of 
these necessary and jointly sufficient projects of reduction – namely, the 
establishment of absolute apodicticity and the establishment of absolute 
ontological precedence – are present in each way. 
However, even granting that this is the case, the Cartesian way must have 
seemed insufficient to Husserl (1970) in some manner inasmuch as he 
subsequently provided another way. Given that the Cartesian way is easily 
misunderstood in that it is taken to be logically or principally insufficient for 
the proper sense of the reduction, the third alternative position argues that the 
two ways could equally depend on each other in an explanatory manner. 
To be clear: The point of this paper is not to argue that one must dispense 
with Kern’s (1977) and Drummond’s (1975) theses in favour only of the 
proposed third alternative. Rather, the aim is to bring more nuance to the 
discussion by showing that Kern’s and Drummond’s theses are not logically 
exhaustive in the debate on how to grasp the relationship between the 
Cartesian and the ontological ways to Husserl’s transcendental reduction. 
The point of the transcendental reduction and its preparation 
Prior to discussing whether the different ways to reduction grasp the sense of 
the reduction as Husserl (2012, 1970) intended, we must clarify the nature of 
this sense or intention.   
Even though the turn to transcendental philosophy in his later writings 
(Husserl 2012) constitutes a break from the ideas of pure, non-metaphysical 
description in the Logical Investigations (Husserl 2002), this earlier work 
introduces some themes and concepts upon which Husserl never turned his 
back (Zahavi 2003, 43). The very project of seeking to isolate the constituents 
of knowledge in order to establish a rigorous foundation for philosophy and 
science in general persists, as do some of the early concepts used in this 
search. These include the idea that consciousness is intentional (Husserl 2002, 
v.2, 95-97) and the notion of epistemological priority, called evidence given to 
experience, which is brought to cognition by the originary giving intuition 
(Husserl 2002, v.1, 177). In other words: Firstly, every conscious act is directed 
at an object by way of intentionality, which means that consciousness is 
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always consciousness of something, whether physical or mental. Secondly, 
epistemological certainty can best be secured when the intention can be 
fulfilled in intuitive perception. This view is maintained in the later work 
Ideas (Husserl 2012) as “the principle of all principles”, which states:  
“that every primordial dator intuition is a source of authority (Rechtsquelle) for 
knowledge, that whatever presents itself in ‘intuition’ in primordial form (as it were 
in its bodily reality), is simply to be accepted as it gives itself out to be, though only 
within the limits in which it then presents itself.” (Husserl 2012, 43)  
Now, as Husserl (2012, 51-60) sees it, we are in the natural attitude in our 
everyday lives. This concept describes our relationship with the entities in our 
sensual and non-sensual surroundings when we engage with them in the 
ordinary. In the natural attitude, we take things to simply be real and to 
straightforwardly exist: We are free to infer from the existence of entities in 
the present perceptual field to the existence of things that are not present in 
this field. This worldview gives reason to take for granted the independently 
meaningful reality of the world around us and serves as a basis for assuming 
a metaphysical realism in science (Husserl 2012, 44-47 & Husserl 1970, 5-7). 
Such realism is, according to Husserl, naïve since, as Luft describes it, when 
we posit ‘truths’ about reality while in the natural attitude, we do not know 
that we are in this attitude and consequently take this attitude to be “the only 
possible ‘way of life’” (Luft 1998, 159). In fact, Husserl (2012, 53-54) argues, 
the mere act of thematising the natural attitude makes it possible to stand 
outside it (in another attitude) and describe it. One is thus naïve in believing 
these truths to be apodictic (Luft 2004, 206-207 & Husserl 2012, 35-37 & 
Husserl 1970, 5-7). 
In order to avoid the naivety of the natural attitude, Husserl (2012) introduces 
the epoché. Evocation of the epoché does not amount to discarding the natural 
attitude; it merely disqualifies the natural attitude’s validity and brackets the 
naïve positing made on the basis of this attitude. The epoché serves as a 
necessary methodological preparation for establishing a rigorous 
epistemological foundation based on the phenomenological evidence of 
which we have previously spoken. In other words, the epoché conditions the 
possibility for a radically new approach to the world, an approach in which 
one gains access to the things as they show themselves in contrast to the naïve 
view in which they show ‘themselves’ as they ‘are’, fitting into preconceived 
theories (Husserl 2012, 59 & Zahavi 2003, 46). 
The transcendental reduction, though part of the same methodological 
contemplation, is distinct from the epoché in not being part of this conditional 
preamble. The epoché signifies the bracketing of the naïve positing of the 
natural attitude. In contrast, the reduction represents the methodological 
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decision to inquire into the relationship between subjectivity and the world in 
which, because of the performance of the epoché, subjectivity is disclosed as 
necessarily contributing to the constitution of meaningful worldly objects 
(Smith 2003, 27).  
Husserl (2012, 33-47 & 1970, 127-129) does not believe that science limits its 
beliefs about the world to that which can be precisely fulfilled in intuition, 
which entails that science, generally speaking, commits to some form of naïve 
realism. As a result, Husserl wishes to make phenomenology the one science 
that does not extend its judgments beyond the borders of intuition as 
described in the principle of all principles (Husserl 2012, 56-58 & 1970, 121-
122). In other words, he wishes to establish a rigorous science that can serve 
as an absolute starting point for philosophy and all other sciences (Husserl 
2012, 1 & 1970, 16-18). With the thematisation of the naivety of the natural 
attitude as well as the realisation that the reason for this naivety is the natural 
attitude’s inability to go beyond itself, so to speak, and critically assess its 
own epistemological foundation, the philosophical search for transcendental 
ground has been proclaimed.  
Drummond (1975) argues that, assuming that the transcendental reduction 
aims to identify the absolute starting point for philosophy, it must commit to 
two projects. 1) The starting point must be absolutely indubitable, that is, 
apodictic. 2) The starting point must be absolutely ontologically precedent 
and in principle independent of the world. Drummond (1975, 48) takes both 
of these requirements to be necessary and only jointly sufficient, and the 
position presented in this paper adopts this view. However, for reasons 
explicated in the following sections, this paper does not adopt Drummond’s 
main conclusion, namely that the Cartesian way exclusively corresponds to 
the first commitment and the ontological way to the second commitment, so 
that one must recognise a dependence not only between the commitments but 
also between the ways. 
When seeking rigour in this manner, it is evident that one cannot remain in 
the naivety and doxic beliefs of the natural attitude. One must leave this 
attitude in order to qualify a point as apodictic and begin world investigations 
from this point of view. This is, however, insufficient. The starting point must 
itself be ontologically prior to all other beings since it would otherwise 
epistemologically ‘qualify’ the ground upon which it itself rests (Drummond 
1975, 63-64). In order for the starting point to be absolutely fundamental to 
our world investigations in the way intended, it cannot itself be something 
worldly or necessitated by something worldly. Both criteria pertain to the 
transcendental attribute, which must be ascribable to the starting point to 
which Husserl (2012; 1970) wishes to reduce. 
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In the following, I will attempt a reading of the different ways to the 
reduction inherent in Husserl’s Ideas and The Crisis. This reading incorporates 
the premise that both of these necessary parts of the reduction already are to 
be found in each of the ways, so that they can be regarded as sufficient in 
themselves – at any rate, on a purely principal level.                 
The Cartesian way to the transcendental reduction in Ideas. 
The first step in the Cartesian way to the transcendental reduction is to reduce 
to the indubitable foundation of cognition by putting aside all that can be 
doubted. This methodological doubt is not universal doubt; rather, it should 
be thought of as the attempt to doubt every intention that I have. It is simply to 
be thought of as a provisional device, not as an epistemological position. One 
can only hold a position like this when the epoché has not yet been put into 
action, seeing as the epoché brackets any such position (Husserl 2012, 57 & 
Smith 2003, 21). Continuing with this idea of attempting to doubt in order to 
reduce to something indubitable, Husserl investigates the mode of givenness 
of spatio-temporal entities and compares this with the mode of givenness of 
the experience of these entities. In other words, Husserl seeks to point out the 
difference between how transcendent objects relate to consciousness and how 
the immanent experience of the objects relates to consciousness. Things in the 
world always give themselves in a perspectival or adumbrated manner, 
meaning that in every ‘now’, there are sides to a given thing that are not 
perceptually accessible to me. One can therefore say that the givenness of 
transcendent things can be doubted whereas, on the other hand, the 
immanent experience of the thing is always given in its entirety because it 
stands in a certain unity with consciousness (Husserl 2012: 78-80). 
By way of methodological doubt, Descartes regresses back to the mind. This 
mind is not, in Husserl’s (cf. 1970, 80) view, transcendental: In quite a peculiar 
manner, it is part of the objective world since Descartes’ doubt is performed 
out of the natural attitude, without intervention from the epoché. That which 
Husserl, on the other hand, uses the Cartesian way to the transcendental 
reduction to reduce to is a transcendental ego (Husserl 2012, 87-89). This ego, 
however, stands in a certain constitutive relationship with the world but is 
not itself a part of this world.      
Kern notices problems in this way to the reduction. These problems seem to 
be fundamental impediments, which eventually force Husserl (1970) to depart 
from the Cartesian way and come up with an alternative way in The Crisis 
(Kern 1977, 131). This would imply that, when following the Cartesian way to 
the transcendental reduction, Husserl relinquishes any possibility of positing 
anything about the world that accords to the idea of evidence from the 
perspective of this ego since, as we saw, such positing can always be doubted. 
By considering the immanent cognitive sphere of the transcendental ego as 
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the residuum of the reduction, the transcendent world is epistemologically 
disconnected or ‘lost’, to the effect that the transcendental reduction cannot 
establish the basis for philosophical knowledge about the world (Kern 1977, 
130). 
Kern (1977, 131-134) derives two other specific problems from the general 
problem of disconnection. The Cartesian way can lead neither to inter-
subjectivity nor to the temporally streaming consciousness of the subject 
performing the reduction. These problems will not be considered in detail 
since a critical assessment of them is unnecessary for the argument in this 
paper. Rather, if it can be made probable that the general problem of 
disconnection is untenable, then the derivative problems will seem untenable 
as well due to the argumentative dependence between the derivative 
problems and the general problem. The dependence can be described in the 
following way: The problem concerning the Cartesian way’s inability to give 
an account of the temporality of the experiencing subject is because the notion 
of immanent experience inherent in the Cartesian way cannot incorporate any 
conception of objective time on which time-consciousness, according to Kern, 
is dependent (1977, 132). Objective time is disconnected along with the ‘outer’ 
or transcendent world (Kern 1977, 133-134). By the same token, the other 
derivative problem is that the Cartesian way cannot lead to inter-subjectivity 
because the experience of other subjects is dubitable, just like the experience 
of any other transcendent phenomena (Kern 1977, 131-133). 
Kern (1977, 130) concludes that the problems in fact result from a 
misunderstanding of the scope of the Cartesian way. The criticism only 
applies if one uses the Cartesian way in order to grasp the proper sense of the 
transcendental reduction. The Cartesian way misses the point of the 
transcendental reduction. It does not establish an absolute philosophical 
viewpoint based on apodictic evidence that can serve as a basis for 
knowledge about the world – not, at any rate, without ending up with the 
aforementioned problems (Kern 1977, 131, 133-134). In order to render 
probable the idea that the Cartesian way is, contrary to this conclusion, 
sufficient in itself, it is thus necessary to give an account of it that at least 
opens up the possibility for its reaching the transcendental starting point in 
the proper sense, without entailing the problem of disconnection. 
One way of looking at Kern’s (1977, 130) conclusion is by taking him to say 
that the phenomenon, which appears to the transcendental ego reached 
through the Cartesian way to the reduction, bears no secure connection to the 
world. Then it all comes down to whether Kern can plausibly maintain that 
no other notion can validly be given on the basis of the Cartesian way than 
that of subjective representation to determine the nature of the phenomenon 
(Kern 1977, 130). With this idea Kern (1977, 130-134), seems to argue that that 
which is determined as phenomenon by the Cartesian way is something that is 
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merely phenomenal to the subject, that is, some kind subjective copy of a 
noumenon.            
When considering more attentively the implications of the dubitability 
regarding the experience of transcendencies as opposed to the apodicticity 
regarding the immanent experience of transcendencies, a certain priority in 
epistemological status is disclosed. Husserl (2012, 95) also attaches this 
hierarchy of priority to the ontological side of the distinction. Being as 
experience, which in its totality we call subjectivity, is ontologically prior to 
being as object. This becomes clear through a Cartesian thought experiment: It 
is conceivable, says Husserl (2012, 93-97), that subjectivity can be given 
without the presence of any transcendent objects whatsoever, whereas the 
opposite scenario (that objects can be given without subjectivity) is 
inconceivable. Subjectivity is precedent to other beings. It is the cause for the 
givenness of other beings but is not itself dependent upon other beings for its 
givenness since it is that which conditions the possibility of givenness as such. 
What appears to subjectivity is apodictic, and subjectivity appears to itself as 
a precedent being. 
Husserl has thereby reduced to the cogito by saying that the only thing about 
which absolute certainty can exist is the object of immanent cognition, 
entailing that the cognising of transcendent objects necessarily involves 
epistemological doubt. In light of the intentionality of consciousness (cf. 
Section 2), however, it is quite probable that we will not end up with 
disconnection because the world continues to exist for us only in a new way. 
We now take it to be the cogitatum of our cogito. This is not a disconnection but 
is, in fact, the establishment of a connection. This notion of phenomenon as 
cogitatum, which can be established through the reduction is not equal to 
mere subjective representation. ‘Phenomenon’ does not denote something 
merely phenomenal, that is, a state of consciousness or a purely mental image. 
What we realise due to these investigative thought experiments is that things 
can exist in no other way than as they are given to subjectivity. The result of 
the Cartesian way is the philosophical realisation that “An object that has 
being in itself (an sich seiender) is never such as to be out of relation to 
consciousness and its Ego.” (Husserl 2012: 91)  
The ontological way to the transcendental reduction in The Crisis  
Kern (1977, 144) argues that only the ontological way grasps the proper sense 
of the transcendental reduction because it is concerned with the relationship 
between subjectivity and the ‘outer’ world and because it does not confine its 
field of investigation to the purely mental.  
“There is no talk even of the ambiguous opposition ‘immanence-
transcendence’, which is typical of the Cartesian way. It is replaced with the 
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opposition between ‘mundane’ (or ‘objective’) and ‘transcendental’. The 
whole line of thinking is determined by the task of clarifying or criticizing 
objective logic and ontology.” (Kern 1977, 142)  
Indeed, Husserl begins by stating that, in its search for objectivity, scientific 
investigation neglects our individual, relative, and intuitional experience of 
entities in the ‘life-world’. The ‘crisis’ is precisely that the objectivistic or 
positivistic sciences have, over the course of time, become so immensely 
successful that they have become haughty. They have ‘forgotten’ that they are 
continuously motivated by and immersed into the pre-scientific wonderment 
caused by puzzles arising in the life-world (Husserl 1970, 5-7 & Zahavi 2003, 
125-127). This becomes the heart of the matter in The Crisis, and Husserl 
discusses this by identifying “the specifically human questions” as those that 
are overlooked or ‘forgotten’ (Husserl 1970, 7). He states: “Scientific, objective 
truth is exclusively a matter of establishing what the world, (…), is in fact. But 
can the world, and human existence in it, truthfully have a meaning if the 
sciences recognize as true only what is objectively established in this fashion, 
(…)?” (Husserl 1970, 6). 
After having carefully put the epoché into action, one can learn something 
from this mistake. Thanks to the epoché, one realises that the modern 
objectivistic sciences are built upon naïve and idealised constructions. It is 
thus obvious for Husserl (1970, 123-135), when seeking to establish an 
absolute ground for cognition, to begin in the life-world and to then work in 
the exact opposite direction than would the scientist, namely by not forming 
yet another “idealizing accomplishment”(Husserl 1970, 140). As a result, the 
ontological way begins with the decision to ‘reduce’ from seeking objective 
truth in a hidden static reality behind mere appearance to giving 
philosophical-phenomenological attention to the life-world. It pays to be 
careful when initially performing the epoché since that into which one is 
actually enquiring by way of phenomenological reflection is the world 
correlative to the natural attitude. One can do so because only the attitude 
itself is bracketed. What remains is the naturalness pertaining to world of the 
natural attitude, which now seems to be “the primary basis of all objectivities” 
and “the ‘meaning fundament’ of all objective sciences” (Drummond 1975, 61-
62). 
The next step in the reduction is to ‘narrow down’ the ontological 
investigation of the life-world and concentrate on the question of what 
ultimately conditions the possibility of appearance in the life-world. 
“One must fully clarify, i.e., bring to ultimate self-evidence, how all the self-
evidence of objective-logical accomplishments, (…) has its hidden sources of 
grounding in the ultimately accomplishing life, the life in which the self-
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evident givenness of the life-world forever has, has attained, and attains anew 
its pre-scientific ontic meaning.” (Husserl 1970, 128)   
Husserl (1970, 157) notices that when we, for instance, look at a thing, we 
always see only one out of many possible surfaces of this thing. So we never 
sensually see the thing as whole, that is, as that thing which we conceptually 
take it to be. “This implies that, while the surface is immediately given, I 
mean more than it offers” (Husserl 1970, 158). In the life-world, I do not 
merely see things, I intend them. And this intending is key to understanding 
what Husserl (1970, 128) means by the life of subjectivity being ultimately 
accomplishing (cf. quote above). By analysing how things are given 
immediately in the life-world, it has become evident that they never just give 
the actually perceived, sensuously felt, heard, etc. surface of themselves but 
are themselves understood as consistent wholes. This leaves the final 
contribution of passively synthesising the perceived, felt, heard, etc. into 
meaningful things to the sense-bestowing activity of transcendental 
subjectivity, which is then established in its ontological priority to things. 
When examining how things appear to us in the life-world, we analyse the 
different modes of givenness. So in a somewhat indirect way, by undertaking 
this analysis, we become aware that it is essential for objects in the life-world 
to appear as they really are to subjectivity (Husserl 1970, 165-170). 
The search for an apodictic point of departure is at play in the ontological way 
to reduction as well. It is inherent in the epistemological question regarding 
the manner of givenness of things in the life-world as opposed to the manner 
of givenness of things in the scientific worldview. This distinction unveils the 
same hierarchy of epistemological security as does the distinction between 
immanent cognition and transcendent cognition in the Cartesian way 
(Husserl 1970, 139). Drummond (1975) does not ascribe any significance to 
this similarity –he does not, at any rate, take this turn towards the manner of 
givenness to concern the project of apodicticity. To be sure, Husserl seems to 
have left behind his old Cartesian jargon, meaning that the use of words such 
as ‘apodictic’ and ’indubitable’ is very scarce. However, these are only words, 
and their limited use does not entail that the search for absolute 
epistemological rigour has been shelved. Drummond (1975, 62) admits that 
apodicticity is still a concern in The Crisis, though not as a part of the 
ontological way to the reduction. The reading of the ontological way to the 
transcendental reduction attempted in this paper opposes Drummond’s 
(1975) reading because it takes the meaning of the question concerning the 
manner of the givenness of things in the life-world to be a matter of pointing 
out in which way our experience of things cannot be doubted. The appearance 
to subjectivity in the life-world is apodictic because the thing as it appears is 
constituted by that very same subjectivity. 
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What Husserl has supposedly discovered following the ontological way to the 
transcendental reduction is a necessity in the relationship between subject and 
object.  
“(…), no conceivable human being, no matter how different we imagine him 
to be, could ever experience a world in manners of givenness which differ 
from the incessantly mobile relativity we have delineated in general terms.” 
(Husserl 1970, 165)        
By discovering the life-world to be the basis of all objectivities and 
subsequently discovering that this world is constituted by subjectivity, it has 
become evident that it would make no sense to talk about the world and its 
things as always-already-determined – as ready-mades, one might say, 
independent of subjectivity (Zahavi 2003, 52). By first describing the ontology 
of the life-world, we have seen that it is impossible for the world and the 
entities in it not to be given as they are. They are relative to the one to whom 
they are given. And because this is relative to subjectivity, it establishes 
apodicticity to the experiences of the life-world made from within the 1st 
person perspective.   
The development of a third alternative position 
By structuring the incompatibilities between Kern’s (1977) reading, 
Drummond’s (1975) reading, and this paper’s proposed reading of Husserl’s 
two ways to the transcendental reduction, it is possible to work out a basis for 
the development of a third alternative position in the discussion on how to 
understand the relationship between these ways.  
At some point, Husserl (1970, 154-157) himself seems to acknowledge what is 
implied in Kern’s (1977) objection to the Cartesian way, saying that it does 
not, in fact, clearly prove the constituting contribution of subjectivity but 
instead entails that the undertakings of phenomenological investigation are 
confined to the realm of the purely mental. Husserl states in The Crisis that, 
with the Cartesian way, it is too easy to: “fall right back into the naïve-natural 
attitude” (Husserl 1970, 155). Indeed, if the Cartesian way advocates solely for 
the investigation of the purely mental, it has not succeeded in showing us the 
way to the strict phenomenological viewpoint – a viewpoint from which we 
take subjectivity to be the condition for the possibility of the manifestation of 
objects. In addition, such a failure would indicate that, in our investigation of 
the subject, we would take it to be just another object, meaning that we have 
not established subjectivity as transcendental subjectivity because subjectivity 
has not been established as ontologically prior.  
Drummond’s (1975, 48-56) reading of the transcendental reduction proposed 
by Husserl in Ideas does not differ from the reading proposed in this paper. 
However, Drummond seems to take the ‘Cartesian way’ as terminating with 
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the ascription of epistemological apodicticity to immanent perception. If this 
is the case, then this way is insufficient for the purpose of the transcendental 
reduction for somewhat the same reasons as those formulated by Kern (1977, 
130-134). Only a sphere of cognitive apodicticity in the immanent experience 
of the transcendental ego has been achieved so far since the transcendental 
ego has not yet been qualified as an ontologically precedent existent 
(Drummond 1975, 62). Drummond thus has to say that both the Cartesian 
way and the ontological way are present in Ideas, seeing as this work does in 
fact account for the transcendental reduction proper. The account of the 
transcendental reduction in The Crisis is, according to Drummond (1975, 62), 
focussed solely on the part concerning the establishment of an absolutely 
precedent existent and is as such only exhibiting the ontological way, though 
in a more explicit manner than in Ideas. In order for this exhibition to be 
complete, it must presuppose that which is obtained regarding apodicticity in 
Ideas.                                   
The reading suggested in this paper cannot agree with either Kern’s (1977) or 
Drummond’s (1975) theses for two basic reasons.  
Firstly, in the analysis at hand, we do not observe any principal difference 
between the ‘final insights’ that the two ways to the transcendental reduction 
end up stating. In other words, both Drummond’s (1975) and Kern’s (1977) 
readings argue that the ways terminate with different conclusions, so to 
speak. Drummond takes each of the ways to tell only half of the story, and 
Kern thinks that we need to dispense with the Cartesian way because it does 
not fulfil the purpose of the transcendental reduction. In this paper, however, 
both ways end up stating that subjectivity is unavoidable when 
epistemological rigour is desired: That is, both ways give us the complete 
understanding of the meaning-constituting contribution of subjectivity – both 
ways lead to transcendental subjectivity, though via different routes.   
Secondly, the Cartesian way is taken to be the sole exposition of the 
transcendental reduction in Ideas, and the ontological way is likewise taken to 
be the sole exposition of the transcendental reduction in The Crisis. 
Drummond’s (1975) reading concludes that the transcendental reduction in 
Ideas leads to full transcendental subjectivity because the Cartesian way with 
which it begins is supplemented by the ontological way. On the contrary, the 
reading in this paper suggests that this is so because the Cartesian way in 
Ideas actually incorporates both aspects of the absolute starting point and that 
the same is true for the ontological way in The Crisis.  
Husserl himself seems to distinguish between the ways by assigning only one 
way to each of these works, and this most directly evident in §43 of The Crisis, 
where he proclaims a new way to the transcendental reduction as opposed to, 
as he describes it: “the much shorter way to the transcendental epoché in my 
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Ideas toward a Pure Phenomenological Philosophy, which I call the ‘Cartesian 
way’” (Husserl 1970: 155). He continues: “Let us begin our new way by 
devoting an exclusive, consistently theoretical interest to the ‘life-world’” 
(Husserl 1970: 155). This gives reason to argue that the distinguishing factor 
for Husserl when talking about different ways to the reduction is the point of 
departure for the given way. This opposes Drummond’s (1975) argument that 
the distinguishing factor has to do with whether Husserl discusses 
transcendental subjectivity as given absolutely apodictically or absolutely 
ontologically precedent. However, in contrast to Drummond’s view, it could 
be argued that, in Ideas, Husserl (2012, 76-80) initiates the transcendental 
reduction inwardly, that is, by assessing different acts of experiencing as he 
travels along the path of the Cartesian way. In The Crisis, he initially focuses 
the transcendental reduction outwardly, that is, aims at the description of the 
ontology of the life-world as he travels along the path of the ontological way. 
In both cases, the way takes a radical turn and seeks to commit to the other of 
the two jointly sufficient projects in the reduction than that with which the 
way was initially concerned. Taking this turn when performing the reduction 
does not, as Drummond (1975) argues, necessarily entail stepping onto 
another way to the reduction. It is my contention that this turn could just as 
well be taken to be an integral part of the way with which one initiated the 
reduction.    
In the presentation of the Cartesian way in Ideas, it was rendered probable 
that it is not solely an epistemological investigation seeking apodictic 
knowledge. It certainly begins as such, but as the investigation proceeds, the 
epistemological questions entail assumptions about the ontological status 
pertaining to the specific manners of givenness as well. Following this idea 
and on the basis of the thought experiment in Ideas, Husserl gives ontological 
priority to subjectivity: 
“It is thus clear that in spite of all talk (…) of a real Being of the human ego, 
and its conscious experiences in the world and of all that belongs thereto in 
any way in respect of ‘psychophysical connexions’ (…) consciousness, 
considered in its ‘purity’, must be reckoned as a self-contained system of Being, 
as a system of Absolute Being.” (Husserl, 2012, 95)         
It similarly became evident when presenting the ontological way that this 
way incorporates some of the epistemological notions about manners of 
givenness to subjectivity, which is the point of departure for the Cartesian 
way. Husserl (1970, 155-157) is concerned with the life-world and with how 
things appear to subjectivity in it in order to avoid the naïve realism that he 
believes science commits to when it takes appearance to be some sort of 
shadow of the real thing, a noumenon behind the appearance. What actually 
interests him is thus that things in the life-world give themselves as they are, 
that is, completely and apodictically to subjectivity. 
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If the ways do not logically presuppose each other, and if it is not the case that 
only one of them grasps the full sense of the transcendental reduction, what 
then is the relationship between the two? How can the third alternative 
position explain Husserl’s reason for proposing the ontological way? 
Husserl’s addition of the ontological way is, in fact, a clarification of some 
underemphasised, though not absent, points in the Cartesian way. These 
underemphasised points are those concerning understanding of the 
phenomenon as the constitution of the thing as it is and not just as a 
subjective representation as well as understanding that subjectivity is the 
condition for this constitution. The ways thus depend upon each other in an 
explanatory sense and not in a strict logical sense. Either way helps to elucidate 
and explicate the full sense of the other. 
Dan Zahavi (2003, 47-56) seems to agree, at least in part, with this thesis. To be 
fair, Zahavi does not explicitly address this particular Kern/Drummond 
discussion and consequently cannot be an active participant in it. He does, 
however, actively distance himself from the view that the Cartesian way is 
inadequate, stating the following about Husserl’s motivation for invoking the 
ontological way: 
“By focussing on the immediate self-givenness of subjectivity and by stressing 
the difference between this givenness and the givenness of objects, one is 
easily led to the belief that the task of phenomenology is to investigate pure 
subjectivity in isolation and separation from both the world and inter-
subjectivity. In part, it is this distortion that Husserl seeks to address and 
overcome in his so-called ontological way to the reduction.” (Zahavi 2003: 50) 
The confusion regarding the Cartesian way to which Zahavi draws attention 
in this quote is, as we saw earlier, what motivated Kern to argue that this way 
implicates a loss because it confines the phenomenological investigation to the 
solely mental. The third alternative position takes this confusion to be based 
on a misunderstanding of the Cartesian way rather than on a logical deficit 
inherent in the way itself.  
Sebastian Luft also seems to assume a position not completely different from 
the third alternative position proposed in this paper. Luft calls attention to a 
systematic order of the ways “where none of these ways devaluate, but rather 
explicates and compliments, the others” (Luft 2004, 205). He further 
emphasises “Husserl’s assertion that the Cartesian way retains its ‘right’ and 
‘validity’ despite the problems Husserl sees with it” (Luft 2004, 205). 
However, Luft’s reasons for saying this make a complete compatibility 
between his position and the position proposed in this paper impossible. Luft 
(2004, 226-228) does not take the Cartesian way to devaluate with the 
presentation of the ontological way because the two ways serve different 
purposes. “Whereas the ‘Cartesian Husserl’ pursues a path of scientific 
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grounding and foundationalism, the ‘life-world Husserl’ is interested in what 
can be called a hermeneutics of the world of everyday life” (Luft 2004, 226). In 
this paper, the ontological way is interpreted to ultimately serve the same 
purpose as the Cartesian way, which is the designation of the viewpoint from 
which rigorous philosophy can be conducted. The hermeneutical consultation 
of the ontology of the ‘life-world’ is instead a means to achieve this end. Thus, 
if Luft were to be an explicit participant in the Kern/Drummond discussion, 
his position would be a fourth. This simply underlines a primary point of this 
paper, namely that there remains much to be said about the transcendental 
reduction in Husserl’s philosophy and that it is philosophically enriching to 
keep thinking about it. 
Closing remarks 
Through a reading of some of the central passages in Husserl’s works on the 
transcendental reduction, this paper proposes an interpretation of the 
relationship between the Cartesian way and the ontological way to the 
reduction, stating that the two ways are dependent upon each other in an 
explanatory way. This dependence is not logical but contingent.  
One should be careful, however, not to underestimate the importance of the 
ontological way. It is more than probable that the charitable reading of the 
Cartesian way proposed in this paper is tacitly dependent upon the clarifying 
intentions of the ontological way in more than a simple explanatory way. The 
constitutive relationship between subjectivity and objects is underemphasised 
in the Cartesian way to the transcendental reduction to the extent that it is 
probable that it would have been practically impossible for a reader to grasp 
Husserl’s intention before the publishing of The Crisis.1 
But no matter the importance of the ontological way, its invocation might not 
be motivated by strict logical necessity but instead for the sake of elucidation. 
Husserl might not, in other words, be correcting a severe mistake in the 
Cartesian way with the ontological way. It is quite probable, and I hope that 
this paper gives credibility to this idea, that he is not radically revising his 
fundamental philosophical outlook with the presentation of the 
transcendental reduction some 20 years later than the publication of Ideas.   
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